How does context affect basic processes of sensory integration and the implicit psychophysical scales that underlie those processes? Five experiments examined how stimulus range and response regression determine characteristics of (a) psychophysical scales for loudness and (b) 3 kinds of intensity summation: binaural loudness summation, summation of loudness between tones widely spaced in frequency, and temporal loudness summation. Context affected the overt loudness scales in that smaller power-function exponents characterized larger versus smaller range of stimulation and characterized magnitude estimation versus magnitude production. More important, however, context simultaneously affected the degree of loudness integration as measured in terms of matching stimulus levels. Thus, stimulus range and scaling procedure influence not only overt response scales, but measures of underlying intensity processing.
How does context affect basic processes of sensory integration and the implicit psychophysical scales that underlie those processes? Five experiments examined how stimulus range and response regression determine characteristics of (a) psychophysical scales for loudness and (b) 3 kinds of intensity summation: binaural loudness summation, summation of loudness between tones widely spaced in frequency, and temporal loudness summation. Context affected the overt loudness scales in that smaller power-function exponents characterized larger versus smaller range of stimulation and characterized magnitude estimation versus magnitude production. More important, however, context simultaneously affected the degree of loudness integration as measured in terms of matching stimulus levels. Thus, stimulus range and scaling procedure influence not only overt response scales, but measures of underlying intensity processing.
Recent years have witnessed a new conception of the role that stimulus context plays in pyschophysical judgment and theory. Traditionally, contextual effects were regarded as unwanted biases in scaling, representing sources of variation that need to be taken into account, but that do not by themselves carry any particular theoretical significance (e.g., S. S. Stevens, 1957) . More recently, with the advance of multifactor models of measurement, context has commanded greater attention and evaluation in scaling, and its unique contributions to psychophysical measurement are now better appreciated (Anderson, 1975; Mellers & Birnbaum, 1982 ). Yet despite this change in conception, virtually all psychophysical investigations of context so far have concentrated on how context influences overt scales of judgment (but see Birnbaum, Parducci, & Gifford, 1971 , for an early attempt to disentangle contextual influences on sensory and judgmental processes).
In contrast, the present study considers the possibility that context may influence what has often been considered relatively "early-level" processing of sensory stimuli. Perhaps effects of stimulus context pervade the underlying perceptual representations, not just the overt responses. Accordingly, in the present studies we measured both overt psychophysical scales and characteristics of the underlying sensory processes and representations, aiming to arrive at a deeper assessment of the loci, size, and theoretical role of context in psychophysics. Our results are profoundly disturbing: They challenge accepted assumptions of psychophysical measurement, bearing both practical and theoretical implications.
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Loudness Summation and Loudness Matching
This study focuses on three kinds of intensity summation in hearing: (a) binaural summation, the summation of loudness across the two ears; (b) two-tone summation, the summation of loudnesses across widely separated sound frequencies; and (c) temporal integration, the increase in loudness over time. All three share a common principle: Within limits set by each summation process, loudness is determined jointly by sound pressure and by a second psychophysical variable: monaural versus binaural presentation, frequency spectrum, or duration.
By what rules do stimulus variables interact in producing sensory effects? Fundamental to identifying any such rule of sensory processing is a principle of invariance or matching (Marks, 1974 (Marks, , 1978a (Marks, , 1979b . To infer the existence of suprathreshold binaural summation of loudness, for instance, we rely jointly on the evidence that (a) both monaural and binaural loudness increase monotonically with increasing sound pressure and (b) a monaural sound must be greater in sound pressure than a corresponding binaural sound to be equally loud.
The difference in decibels between equally loud monaural and binaural tones provides a measure of binaural loudness summation. Thus, for pure tones we may write N,,, = Nb + BG,
where Nm and Nb are the matching monaural and binaural sound pressure levels (SPLs, in decibels), respectively. The difference between the matching levels, BG, represents the binaural gain. In several experiments using pure tones and narrow-band noises, we found that the binaural gain is roughly constant over a wide range of SPLs (about 35-100 dB) and equal to about 10 dB (Algom & Marks, 1984; Marks, 1978a Marks, , 1978c Marks, , 1979a Marks, , 1979b Marks, , 1987 .
This value of 10 dB is especially interesting because Stevens's (1956) sone function states that loudness increases as the 0.6 power of sound pressure, and thereby doubles with every 10-dB increase in SPL. Consider binaurally presented 1000-Hz tones of 50 and 60 dB; by definition, they have loudnesses of 2 and 4 sones, respectively. If a binaural tone of 50 dB sounds as loud as a monaural tone of 60 dB, then both the binaural 50-dB tone and the monaural 60-dB tone have a loudness of 2 sones, half the loudness of the binaural 60-dB tone. Accordingly, a constant binaural gain of 10 dB implies that binaural tones are twice as loud as corresponding monaural tones; that is, binaural loudness summation is "complete."
In general, then, loudness matches enable us to characterize the rule of interaural summation, if we know the psychophysical function relating loudness to sound pressure. Given the sone scale, a binaural gain of 10 dB implies a doubling of loudness, or in the case of binaural listening, complete interaural loudness summation. Note the restriction that the underlying scale or representation be specified. If instead of the sone scale we start with Garner's (1954) lambda scale, where lambda loudness doubles roughly with every 20-dB increase in sound pressure, then a binaural gain of 10 dB would entail less than complete summation of lambda loudness units.
Sensory Matching and Magnitude Estimation
Sensory equalities or invariances are often determined readily by direct intensity-matching procedures. However, equalities can also be determined by numerical rating procedures such as magnitude estimation. A set of magnitude estimates, obtained with stimuli that differ in perceived quality or in other dimensions, contains in principle information much like that found in direct matches. Even if the numerical judgments provide no more than a rank ordering of the sensory values, the judgments can nevertheless suffice to permit one to find the stimulus combinations that yield equal sensation magnitudes. The rationale for scaling procedures such as magnitude estimation to function as "null methods" is simply that "when a person, on the average, assigns the same number to two different sensory events, he means to say that they have the same sensory magnitude" (J. C. Stevens & Marks, 1980, p. 379) .
But are stimuli judged to be equally intense in one contextual situation necessarily judged to be equally intense in other contexts? Recent evidence (Marks, 1988; Marks, Szczesiul, & Ohlott, 1986) suggested to us that there may be severe limits to the validity, or at least to the consistency, of the principle that we call matching-by-scaling, which is the principle that subjects do give the same rating, on average, to equally intense stimuli presented in different contexts. For instance, Marks (1988) scaled the loudness of tones of different frequencies and found context to affect matches appreciably. When subjects judged the loudness of Iow-SPL 500-Hz tones and high-SPL 2500-Hz tones, one set of matching values emerged; but when the subjects judged high-SPL 500-Hz tones and low-SPL 2500-Hz tones, markedly different matches emerged. Even when qualitative differences were minimized (by presenting different contextual sets of stimulus intensities to different ears rather than at different sound frequencies), context still affected the matching values, albeit less so.
One aim of the present study was to test further the principle of matching-by-scaling by examining three processes of loudness integration, namely, binaural summation, two-tone summation, and temporal summation. For each, our results can be readily evaluated against a rich background of experimental studies, several of which relied on matching-by-scaling. If it turns out that matches derived from magnitude estimates depend highly on context, then these measures may require reinterpretation. Thus, questions about the status of matching-by-scaiing transcend methodology and speak to fundamental issues of sensory processing. The experiments described later address these issues by establishing different contexts (a) through different stimulus ranges (large vs. small) and (b) through different scaling procedures (magnitude estimation versus magnitude production). We review in turn the known effects of these two manipulations.
Effect of Stimulus Range
How does the judgment of a given stimulus depend on the other stimuli with which it is presented? This has been an important topic of research in the last two decades, rooted in the tradition of Helson's (1964) adaptation-level theory (e.g., Anderson, 1975; Mellers & Birnbaum, 1982; Parducci, 1965 Parducci, , 1974 Parducci, Knobel, & Thomas, 1976) . Stimulus range is one of the salient properties of the stimulus context constraining judgment, systematically influencing the exponent of the psychophysical power function: The larger the stimulus range, the smaller the exponent (e.g., R. Teghtsoonian, 1971 Teghtsoonian, , 1973 R. Teghtsoonian & M. Teghtsoonian, 1978) .
How does range influence exponent? A simple explanation argues that the changes are due to response bias. According to a common version, people tend to use a constant range of numerical responses, independent of the range of physical stimuli and, therefore, independent of the range of underlying perceptual events that intervene between stimulus and overt response. In the extreme, if subjects applied exactly the same range of numbers to all stimulus ranges, there would be a perfect inverse relation between log stimulus range and exponent. In fact, the extant data suggest that subjects tend only in part to keep response range constant. Nevertheless, this implicit model assumes that range operates in the "final common path," affecting in a straightforward manner the responses given to all of the stimuli in the ensemble being judged. One implication of this model, which we spell out in the next section, is that variations in response induced by changing stimulus range should have no effect at all on sensory matches. That is, the model predicts no systematic change in perceptual matches obtained through scaling.
A main question we ask in this study is, Are range-induced differences in the exponents of loudness functions accompanied by corresponding differences in indexes of basic auditory functioning, say, in degree of binaural summation? If not, then the differences in exponent could justifiably be attributed solely to differences in the ways that subjects use numerical concepts with different stimulus ranges. If, however, indexes of auditory functioning such as binaural gain also vary systematically with range, then the differences in exponent may reflect real, context-induced changes in the ways that subjects process auditory intensity.
Effect of Scaling Procedure: Regression
The so-called regression effect owes its name to the observation (S. S. Stevens & Greenbaum, 1966) that, in many kinds of psychophysical judgment, subjects tend to constrict the range of their responses on whichever variable is placed under their control. In magnitude estimation, the subjects provide numbers to match sound intensities presented by the experimenter; in magnitude production, the subjects produce sound intensities to match numbers provided by the experimenter. Because psychophysicists traditionally plot the logarithm of numbers against the logarithm of sound intensities, the slope (exponent) obtained with magnitude production is usually steeper than that obtained with magnitude estimation (see also Cross, 1973; Cross, Tursky, & Lodge, 1975) , save when the stimulus range is very small (R. Teghtsoonian & M. Teghtsoonian, 1978) .
Note that the very designation of regression implies an explanation in terms of response bias. So does S. S. Stevens's (e.g., 1971 ) proposed remedy, namely, to average exponents obtained from estimation and production to arrive at the putatively valid measure of the exponent. As with effects of stimulus range, the implicit model of regression assumes that all responses are modified by the same (power) transformation, and thus that sensory matches are invariant across changes in overt exponent.
As with stimulus range, we seek to locate the source of the regression effect by examining loudness scales in conjunction with measures of underlying loudness processing, such as binaural summation. If magnitude estimation and production yield different exponents, but this difference is not mirrored by corresponding differences in sensory matches, then the common explanation in terms of response bias remains tenable. If, on the other hand, binaural loudness summation (or two-tone summation) differs when measured by magnitude estimation and by magnitude production, then this taskdependent contextual effect presumably reflects more than response bias, maybe an actual change in either the underlying perceptual representation or in the rule of summation.
Two Models of Range and Regression Effects
Contextual effects, such as those resulting from the manipulation of stimulus range or judgmental task, can be modeled explicitly according to their hypothesized loci of influence. As we noted, context may affect the oven, numerical response or the underlying perceptual representation (or rule of sensory integration). Although these are by no means the only possible kinds of contextual interaction, nonetheless they serve as main theoretical alternatives. So it may be instructive to derive formally the implications of response-based and perceptionbased models. In the following derivations, we take binaural summation as an example, although both models readily generalize to other kinds of sensory integration.
We start with S. S. Stevens's (1957) power equation. If the overt response for loudness, R, is a simple power function with exponent n of sound pressure, P, then the equations for monaural (m) and binaural (b) listening, respectively, can be written
We assume for simplicity that the two ears are equally sensitive, so that a single equation suffices to describe monaural hearing. We also assume that, to a first approximation, the exponent n is constant, so n = nb = n,,. From Equations 2 and 3, the ratio of binaural to monaural loudness (BR) at constant sound pressure equals ko/km. We can derive the difference in decibels between equally loud monaural and binaural stimuli, the binaural gain (BG), as follows. By definition, when the monaural and binaural stimuli sound equally loud, Hence,
yielding a binaural gain BG = 20.1og(Pm/Ph) = 20.1og(kb/km) '/".
(6)
Ifkdk,, = 2, then binaural summation is complete. If, further, loudness is counted in sones (i.e., n = 0.6), then, as indicated earlier, complete summation implies that the binaural gain equals 10 dB.
Contextual influences arise from transformations imposed either by nonlinear judgmental processes (Model 1) or by nonlinear changes in the underlying perceptual scale values (Model 2). In both models, we take the nonlinear process to be transformation of R by a power function with exponent c; the choice of a nonlinear transformation comes naturally, considering that numbers obtained by magnitude estimation can be treated as a logarithmic interval scale, which preserves equality of ratios whose absolute values cannot be determined. The crucial difference between the models lies in the locus or stage where this power transform applies.
Model 1 (Response Bias)
The model assumes a response process in which context causes the subjects' number scale to stretch or contract; that is, context affects only the overt responses, not the percepts that underlie those responses. Mathematically, we assume a nonlinear judgmental bias c dependent on context, such that R',, = R,, C and R'b = R{, where values of R' correspond to transformed (context-influenced) responses. From Equations 2 and 3, it follows that the observed exponent will equal c-n, and the monaural and binaural equations become R',,, = kruPP,,, ~" 
whereas the binaural gain is unchanged, BG' = 20.1og(kb/km) '/". (10) Therefore, the simple response-bias model predicts that contextual manipulations of stimulus range or judgmental task will change the value of BR, the ratio of binaural to monaural loudness, as well as the value of n, the measured exponent, but will leave the binaural gain unaltered and, by implication, will not influence the underlying representations of loudness.
Model 2 (Perceptual Change)
This model attributes contextual influences to fundamental changes that occur at the perceptual level. According to this model, context produces nonlinear transformations that directly affect the psychophysical processing of loudness. In its extreme form, changing context induces a power transformation c on the underlying monaural and binaural loudness functions such that R",,, = k,,P,, c" (11) and R"b = kbPb% (12) This leaves the binaural to monaural loudness ratio unchanged,
but alters appreciably the magnitude of the binaural gain, BG" = 20.1og(kb/k, , ) ~/tc").
(14)
Model 2 thereby predicts a contextual change in the number of decibels needed to augment a monaural stimulus to sound as loud as a binaural stimulus. It argues that context-based changes in exponent reflect genuine changes in perception, and not just in overt responses. Interestingly, however, the model in its present form also predicts an invariant ratio of binaural to monaural loudness despite the sensory change.
There are a couple of different theoretical interpretations that we can give to Model 2, depending on how we interpret changes in relations to exponent and multiplicative constant. Note that Model l--simple response transformationmpredicts that the power transformation c applies to the entire set of psychophysical equations; hence, c comes to modify both n and k (Equations 7 and 8). Model 2, however, assumes that c modifies just the exponent n. One interpretation, implied by the description given previously here, is that context changes the underlying loudness percepts by modifying rateof-growth of intensity perception. This is a "pure" perceptual interpretation. An alternative is that context differentially affects monaural and binaural loudness judgments; we can derive Equations 11 and 12 by assuming that context transforms all of the loudness responses by power c, but subsequently causes the monaural responses to be divided by km ~ and the binaural responses to be divided by kb c. This second interpretation might be considered a complex model of response transformation. However, because it leads to a change in sensory matches, a change in the stimuli judged equally loud, we consider it to fall under the rubric of perceptual change.
The following series of experiments was designed to test the predictions from those two models so as to understand better the psychological processes involved. Three experiments used the method of magnitude estimation to erect loudness functions at the different levels of one component (i.e., for monaural and binaural listening, for one-frequency and twofrequency tones, or for two durations); by making horizontal cuts across the corresponding pairs of functions, we could assess the respective amounts of loudness summation. The common contextual variable was stimulus range: We derived indexes of loudness growth and summation using both small and large ranges of SPLs. Two additional experiments tested how scaling procedure affects binaural summation and twotone summation; using magnitude estimation and magnitude production, we evaluated how the regression effect manifests itself in both loudness growth and loudness summation.
Extensive, repetitive measurements on each subject enabled us to relate parameters of individual loudness functions (in particular, power-function exponents) to measures of auditory integration as we sought to answer the following questions: How does the variation in exponent relate to variation in measures of loudness processing, namely summation, that can be derived independently of subjects' numerical judgments? Does range or regression affect the metric-free indexes of loudness summation such as binaural gain, and, therefore, perhaps affect the underlying representation for loudness? Experiment 1. Binaural Summation: Effect of Stimulus Range
Qualitatively, binaural summation refers to the finding that a signal of a given SPL is louder when it is heard by two ears than by only one. Quantitatively, however, we wish to measure how much louder. This measurement depends on specifying a subjective unit of sound intensity, that is, on constructing an appropriate loudness scale. Note that the measured difference (in decibels) between monaural and binaural signals that match for loudness does not itself determine the amount of binaural loudness summation in subjective units.
Consider the binaural summation of pure tones, the type of signal used in the present experiments. According to the sone function, loudness doubles with each 10-dB increase in sound pressure. Now, Marks (1978a Marks ( , 1978c Marks ( , 1979a Marks ( , 1979b and Algom and Marks (1984) found that the loudness of a binaurally presented tone equaled the loudness of a corresponding monaural tone augmented by 10 dB. Taken together, the two results imply linear addition in sones, so a binaural sound is, on average, twice as loud as a monaural sound of the same SPL. This simple additivity of loudnesses across the two ears holds, however, only when the loudness function yields the sone scale. Use of another loudness scale would impose a different description of the quantitative rule of summation.
Given the close relation between scale and summation, we ask here, Does varying the stimulus context--a factor known to affect the scale--also influence characteristics of summation? Curiously, in this respect, investigations of range typically have limited themselves to studying effects on overt psychophysical scales, not on the loudness processes that those scales sustain. In the present set of experiments, we consider the possibility that context may affect both, as we ask how context (range) influences overt psychophysical scales (exponents of power functions and ratios of binaural to monaural loudness) and underlying processes of summation (binaural gain in decibels).
Method
Subjects. Two subexperiments were performed. Eight men and women took part in Experiment la, 11 men and women in Experiment lb. All were paid volunteers from the Yale University community who had at least some experience with the method of magnitude estimation, although not necessarily in judging loudness. None of the subjects in this or any subsequent experiment reported a history of hearing problems, and presumably all had normal hearing.
Apparatus and procedure. The stimuli consisted of l-s bursts of a 1000-Hz tone, with 10-ms rise and decay, presented either monaurally to the left or the right ear or binaurally through TDH-39 headphones mounted in MX41/AR cushions. Stimuli were generated by Coulbourn Instruments (Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania) modules under the control of an Apple lie microcomputer. The tones took on nine different SPLs, but their spacing and hence the overall spread differed in the two conditions of stimulus range.
In Experiment la, intensities varied from 34 to 90 dB SPL in steps of 7 dB in the large-range condition and from 48 to 76 dB in steps of 3.5 dB in the small-range condition. In Experiment lb, we made the monaural stimuli 10 dB greater than the corresponding binaural stimuli, the goal being to equate better the monaural and binaural loudnesses; that is, we preselected stimulus sets on the basis of earlier findings that the binaural gain should approximate 10 dB. In the large-range condition of Experiment lb, monaural sounds varied from 42 to 90 dB and binaural sounds from 32 to 80 dB, all in 6-dB steps. In the small-range condition, the corresponding ranges were 54 to 78 dB and 44 to 68 dB in 3-dB steps.
In each experiment, and for each range condition, the entire set of 27 tones (9 SPLs in each mode of stimulation: binaural, left ear, and right ear) was presented and judged a total of five times within the course of a session. Each subject served in four such sessions, in two judging the stimuli of the large-range set, in the other two judging those of the small-range set. Within a session, the order of stimulus levels and modes of stimulation were random and different for every subject. Across sessions, the two sets were presented in strict alternation, their sequence counterbalanced randomly across subjects.
The method w~ magnitude estimation with no specified modulus. Subjects were instructed to assign to the first stimulus whatever number they deemed appropriate to stand for its loudness, and then to assign to succeeding stimuli other numbers in proportion. Whole numbers, decimals, and fractions were permitted. The number zero could reflect the absence of a sound, but it was never reported.
Results and Discussion
Pooled data. An overall picture of the results from Experiments la and lb may be gleaned from the two panels of Figure 1 , which show the data pooled over subjects. In both experiments, the magnitude estimates given by each subject to each stimulus were averaged arithmetically within sessions, and these means were then averaged geometrically across subjects in each condition. Two observations are noteworthy. First, the contextual set of the stimuli--range of SPL--exerted a modest effect on the relative rate-of-growth of loudness in Experiment 1 a, but a much more substantial effect in Experiment 1 b. Second, and perhaps most surprising, range affected the binaural gain, the size of the horizontal separation between the monaural and binaural loudness functions, especially in Experiment lb. This measure of loudness summation, which is derived independently of the subjects' numerical responses, was greater with the large stimulus range than with the small stimulus range.
In Experiment 1 a, range had only a small effect. As the lefthand panel of Figure 1 shows, monaural loudness (averaged over left-ear and right-ear presentations) and binaural loudness approximate power functions in both range conditions; that is, the data conform to straight lines in the log-log coordinates. The power functions with large stimulus range have exponents of 0.53 and 0.50 for binaural and monaural listening, respectively. The fits to the power transforms are satisfactory; Pearson r 2 equals .995 in both cases. The functions at small stimulus range have slightly steeper slopes; exponents are 0.58 (r 2 = .999) for binaural listening and 0.53 (r 2 = .997) for monaural listening.
In Experiment lb, where we attempted to equalize subjective intensities across modes of presentation, the loudness functions have substantially larger exponents with small than with large stimulus range: 0.51 and 0.36, respectively.
Just as changing stimulus range effected a greater difference in exponent in Experiment lb, so did changing range effect a greater difference in summation. The binaural gain is the horizontal separation between the respective pairs of monaural and binaural loudness functions. In Experiment I a, with the large range, the average number of decibels separating the two functions is 7.3; with the small range, it is 7.1. By way of contrast, in Experiment lb the two binaural gains differ substantially, averaging 7.5 dB with the small range, but 9.8 dB with the large range.
This outcome is at odds with the prediction of Model 1, which assumes that stimulus range induces a uniform change in numerical responses. A uniform change in scale--a change in the way subjects conceive of "loudness ratios"--would correspond to a stretching or contracting of the response scale, hence a simple renumbering of the ordinate in the two panels of Figure 1 , with no concomitant change in the horizontal separation between monaural and binaural loudness functions. The change in horizontal separation, that is, in binaural gain, suggests instead the need to invoke some version of Model 2, which assumes that context modifies perception as well as response.
Given that Experiment l a showed a very small effect of range on binaural gain, it may be tempting to conclude that in Experiment la range had a very small effect on overt magnitude scales (presumably by influencing how the subjects assigned numbers to sensations), but did not affect underlying sensory processes, at least as measured by interaural summa- tion. The substantial effect of stimulus range on binaural gain in Experiment 1 b, however, urges us to take a closer look at the data of Experiment la. Inspection of the left-hand panel in Figure 1 makes it clear that, for large range, there is an abrupt and marked decrease in the separation of the monaural and binaural functions at the upper right (at the two highest SPLs). Were we to exclude these atypical values from the calculations, then for this condition the binaural gain would become 8.2 dB compared with 7. l dB for small range. An even better comparison comes by examining only the region of overlapping SPLs in the two conditions (i.e., the SPLs defined by the small-range set of stimuli). This measure results in an average binaural gain at large range of 7.8 dB. Therefore, at all but high SPL, the binaural gain for the large-range set of stimuli is greater than that for the small-range set by about 0.7-1 dB.
It is possible, of course, that the degree of summation is not constant, that it decreases with SPL, and hence that the decrease in gain at very high levels is real (and should count in calculating overall binaural gain). However, we suspect instead that the decline in summation is the result of confounding and response bias. First, besides being loud, tones at such levels often are annoying if not painful (cf. Algom, Raphaeli, & Cohen-Raz, 1986) . Second, in Experiment 1 a the SPLs presented monaurally and binaurally were identical, and thus the overall monaural and binaural loudnesses differed. Given unequal loudnesses, subjects might not compensate duly for the extra strength of the loudest binaural sounds. Third, virtually all previous studies of binaural summation with tones (e.g., Algom, Ben Aharon, & Cohen-Raz, 1989; Algom & Marks, 1984; Algom, Rubin, & Cohen-Raz, 1989; Marks 1978a Marks , 1979a Marks , 1979b Marks , 1987 Scharf, 1969; Scharf & Fishken, 1970) have shown constant amounts of summation over all but very low levels of sound pressure. Fourth, even with wide-band spectra--for which summation does change with level--the variation of summation with SPL goes in the direction opposite to that found here (e.g., Algom, Adam, & Cohen-Raz, 1988; Marks, 1980; Schaff & Fishken, 1970 ; see also Reynolds & S. S. Stevens, 1960) . Therefore, available evidence suggests that judgments of the loudest stimuli in the large-range set do not accurately reflect the amount of interaural summation. By this token, however surprising, even the results of Experiment la, but especially those of Experiment lb, imply that stimulus range affects at least one measure of underlying auditory processing: the magnitude of binaural gain. To repeat, these results bring into question the commonly held model that assumes that range exerts its effects on responses only.
It is interesting, and presumably of some importance, that range exerted substantially greater effects in Experiment lb than in Experiment la. It appears that Experiment lb was reasonably successful in roughly equalizing the loudnesses of monaural and binaural tones for each stimulus range. This procedure may be necessary to demonstrate full range effects, and, indeed, to validly appraise any contextual effect, whether intramodal (Marks, 1988) or intermodal (Marks et al., 1986) . Earlier investigations of range effects were unidimensional; they studied the effect by applying different stimulus ranges to a single sensory variable, such as linear extent or binaural loudness. Hence, no need arose for equalizing sensations across different dimensions of stimulation, but then neither could these studies tell anything about the effect of stimulus range on underlying psychophysical processes.
Indexes of loudness growth and binaural summation. Although not of primary interest, three additional features of the data deserve mention. First, consider the size of the loudness exponents. In Experiment la, all are about 0.55, close to the 0.6 of S. S. Stevens's (1956) sone scale. In Experiment lb, however, the exponents are considerably smaller, averaging about 0.44.
Second, consider the magnitude of binaural summation. Experiment 1 a produced a binaural gain of only about 7 to 8 dB in both range conditions, smaller than the 10-dB gain that characterizes full interaural additivity when loudness is counted in sones; thus, summation was systematically less than complete. In Experiment lb summation was again a bit less than l0 dB. Although with the large stimulus range the binaural gain did approximate 10 dB, with the small range it fell 2 dB short of perfect summation.
Third, consider the ratios of binaural to monaural loudness, which also showed less than complete summation, averaging 1.58 and 1.54, respectively, for small and large range in Experiment la, and 1.55 and 1.5 l, respectively, for small and large range in Experiment lb. The rough constancy in the binaural loudness ratios across variations in stimulus range, despite the changes in exponent and binaural gain, again speaks against the response-based Model l, but is consistent with the hypothesis underlying Model 2--that stimulus range affects some property of the underlying loudness perception.
Given the close relation between loudness scale and loudness summation described earlier here--the amount of summation, measured in loudness units, varies directly with the size of the power-function exponent--it may seem sensible to rescale the data, by a power transformation, to agree with the sone scale. Although rescaling to sones does increase the amount of binaural loudness summation, especially in Experiment lb, such rescaling does not make either set of data fully additive. For example, rescaling the responses in Experiment lb to sones produces an average summation ratio of 1.8, still short of perfect loudness summation.
The present findings of subadditive loudness summation do agree with some earlier reports (e.g., Algom, Rubin, & Cohen-Raz, 1989; Scharf & Fishken, 1970) . In fact, the values of binaural gain, loudness summation, and exponent all correspond at least roughly across the three studies. Conversely, the present results contrast with the conclusion of other studies showing perfect interaural summation (e.g., Algom & Marks, 1984; Hellman & Zwislocki, 1963; Jankovic & Cross, 1977; Levelt, Riemersma, & Bunt, 1972; Marks, 1978a , 1978c , 1979a . Several of these studies (all but that of Hellman & Zwislocki, 1963) tested stimuli composed of both equal and unequal SPLs presented to the two ears. Perhaps perfect binaural summation in sones--2:1 ratio of binaural to monaural loudness; binaural gain of 10 dB--is typically achieved only with experimental designs that use unequal (including monaural) stimulation as well as equal stimulation of the two ears.
Our main point here, however, concerns neither the absolute amount of summation nor the "true" value of the exponent of the power function for loudness, but rather their vicissitudes across contextual changes in stimulus range. The results, taken as a whole, suggest that when increasing stimulus range decreases the exponent it also increases the binaural gain.
Individual results." Effects of range on exponent and binaural gain. Analyses of the data on individual subjects of Experiments la and lb appear in Table 1 . Graphic displays of each subject's data in Experiment la, analogous to the one shown in Figure l , appear in Figure 2 . Again, we focus on two aspects of each subject's results: how range affects the psychophysical function and how range affects the amount of interaural summation. However, we are interested as well in the size of interindividual variation on the different measures.
First, consider the psychophysical functions in Experiment 1 a. Subjects differed considerably in how they assigned numbers to the various sound stimuli. Although each subject's data could be described by a power function (see Figure 2) , the exponents of the magnitude-estimation functions for the monaural and binaural stimuli varied notably, from about 0.31 to about 0.82 with a mean of 0.54. This range of loudness exponent, somewhat more than 2:1, is typical (Algom & Marks, 1984 ; J. C. Stevens & Guirao, 1964 ; see also Marks, 1974) . Superimposed on these individual differences, however, is systematic variation related to stimulus range. For 6 of the 8 subjects, the loudness functions at small range are steeper than their counterparts at large range. The change in exponent is modest, however, averaging an insignificant increase of 0.1.
Next consider the binaural gain. The tendency for exponents to become smaller when the range is increased is accompanied by a corresponding tendency for the binaural gains to increase with range. Thus, for 5 of the 8 subjects of Experiment la, the binaural gain was greater for the larger stimulus range. Although the average gains (7.0 dB and 7.5 dB for the small-range and large-range conditions, respectively) did not differ significantly, if we discount the data points at high SPLs, we increase notably the range-dependent difference in gain. In this case, for the large-range condition, the average binaural gains increase tO 8.4 dB, reliably greater than the average gains of 7.0 dB in the small-range condition, t(7) = 2.65, p = .03. Limiting the comparison solely to the strictly overlapping portions of the stimulus sets yields a less reliable difference in gain of 1.2 dB, t(7) = 1.97, p = .09. Hence, the small but largely unexpected influence on loudness summation of stimulus range, documented in the group data, also appears to a very small extent in the data of many of the individual subjects in Experiment la.
Both features of the range effect noted in Experiment la reappear more clearly in the data of Experiment lb. First, all individual exponents evidence a clear range effect, being greater at small stimulus range (0.50) than at large range (0.36), the difference being highly significant, t(10) = 4.90, p < .001, commensurate with earlier data (cf. Rollman & Harris, 1987; R. Teghtsoonian, M. Teghtsoonian, & Karlsson, 198 l) that report effects of range on exponent. Second, as in Experiment la, the binaural gain is greater for large stimulus range (9.74 dB) than for small (8.07 dB), the difference being highly reliable, t(10) = 3.16, p = .01. Clearly, the context established by varying the range of stimulus intensities did not merely influence idiosyncrasies in the subjects' use of numbers. Range also influenced the degree of loudness summation.
Individual results: Relation between summation ratio and exponent. Given the extensive measurements at the individual level, a closer look at the individual differences seems warranted. In Experiment la, the power-function exponents Note. nm --exponent of monaural loudness function; nb = exponent of binaural loudness function; BR = binaural:monaural loudness ratio; BG = binaural gain in decibels.
(n) displayed the usual interindividual variation: The standard deviations were 16% and 24% of the means, respectively, for large and small range. The ratios of binaural to monaural loudness (BR) also fluctuated considerably from subject to subject, although to a somewhat lesser extent: The respective coefficients of variation were 10% and 25%. Noteworthy, however, is the close connection between n and BR: Where the exponent is great so is the summation ratio: r(6) = .77 and .83, p = .03 and 0.01, respectively, for small and large range.
A linear relation between exponent and log summation ratio is precisely what we would predict if variations in the two indexes were due largely to variation in the use of numbers (e.g., Algom & Marks, 1984; Marks, 1987 ; see also Algom & Marks, 1989) . If subjects differ, by power transformation, in the ways they use numbers to scale loudnesses, then the observed loudness exponent should relate linearly to the logarithm of the observed binaural ratio. Mathematically, if L,~ = kP n and L~ = 1.6kP n describe monaural and binaural loudness functions, respectively, where L is in sones, then any nonlinear judgmental response (power transformation of loudness by exponent a) will yield observed exponents equal to n. a and observed summation ratios equal to (1.6k)a/I: = 1.6L Thus, the observed exponent (n.a) should be proportional to the observed binaural ratio (a-log 1.6), with the slope of proportionality corresponding to the exponent governing the sone function.
Note that the linear relation between exponent and summation ratio is not predicted by Model 2. Model l does predict such a relation, not for the various subjects in a given condition, but for the different contextual conditions: According to Model l, transformation of response should simultaneously and equally affect exponent (Equations 7 and 8) and binaural ratio (Equation 9). But this was not the outcome. Summation ratio did not correlate with exponent across contextual conditions, contrary to Model 1. The correlation of exponent and summation ratio across subjects implies that contextual variation and interindividual variation arise from different sources. Figure 3 shows the pertinent results from the two ranges used in Experiment la. Each point represents the exponent and binaural summation ratio obtained from a single subject in a given condition of stimulus range. The straight line gives the prediction made from two joint assumptions, that loudness sums partially and that an exponent of 0.6 represents the transformation from sound pressure to loudness; that is, the line extends from the origin (where a = 0) through the point corresponding to an exponent of 0.6 and summation ratio of 1.6:l or a log ratio of 0.2 (where a = 1). Interestingly, a bestfitting line passing through the origin would extend to an exponent of 0.62 at 1.6: l summation; correspondingly, at an exponent of 0.6, the best-fitting line would imply a summation ratio of 1.7:1.
The variation of points around the line in Figure 3 probably represents mostly "noise," although it may also represent some real individual differences in the underlying rule of summation or in the size of the exponent governing the underlying loudness scale (e.g., Algom & Marks, 1984 ; Algom, Rubin Marks, 1987; Schneider, 1980 Schneider, , 1988 ; see also Algom, Palmon, & Cohen-Raz, 1989) . Nevertheless, to a good first approximation, the joint rules of subadditive loudness summation and sone scale characterize the average results. Most important here, however, Figure 3 implies that at least some of the variation in both summation and exponent derives from differences in the use of numbers to judge loudnesses. By virtue of the same analysis, the variation associated with changing stimulus range does not derive from idiosyncratic number behavior, but may represent real variation in both the underlying loudness scale and underlying loudness summation. Experiment lb also revealed notable individual differences in the magnitude-estimation exponent, with exponents generally smaller when the range was large (0.24-0.62) versus small (0.28-0.87). Again, these individual exponents covaried to a great extent with their respective binaural loudness ratios (r = .89 and .86 for large and small range, both p < .01), pointing to a common source of variation, namely, idiosyncrasies in the use of numbers to describe sensations.
Subjects in Experiment lb were significantly more alike in their binaural loudness ratios (SDs of about 17% of the mean) and binaural gains (21%) than in their exponents (33%). Algom and Marks (1984) reported similar findings: The dispersion of exponents derived from binaural gains alone was remarkably small, considerably smaller than the great variation in magnitude-estimation exponents. Both Experiments la and lb suggest that individual differences in numerical scales largely, although perhaps not wholly, represent differences in the ways that people assign numbers to sensation magnitudes. The underlying sensory representations of loudness are substantially more uniform, although not, as the present study suggests, wholly uniform (Algom, Palmon, & Cohen-Raz, 1989; Schneider, 1980 Schneider, , 1988 .
Conclusions
Stimulus range exerts two systematic effects on psychophyscial performance. The first, already well known, is on power-function exponent: the larger the range, the smaller the exponent. However, range also affects binaural gain, and thus perhaps the underlying representation for loudness: The larger the range, the greater the binaural gain. The commonly observed effect on exponent thus may entail at least in part a modification of sensory magnitudes brought about by altered context.
That stimulus range affects the underlying measures of loudness summation is a striking finding that, if supported, poses a serious threat to accepted psychophysical notions and practices. For one, it means that context, established by mere change in the range of the stimuli presented, alters the number of decibels needed to augment a monaural stimulus to sound as loud as a binaural stimulus. Range thus affects the measure of a basic auditory process and, perhaps, of the underlying loudness scales. As a practical matter, this means that sensory matches established on the basis of magnitude scaling can be contextually limited. The underlying scale or the rule of summation is relative to the particular range of stimuli within which judgments are made. Before these implications can be fully articulated, however, we need more supporting evidence. How prevalent are such contextual effects? In particular, do changes in the range of stimulus intensities affect other processes of auditory summation and judgment? This we take up in the subsequent experiments.
Experiment 2. Two-Tone Summation of Loudness:
Effect of Stimulus Range When acoustical energy falls within a relatively limited range of sound frequencies, the overall loudness depends on the total acoustical energy. The frequency range over which the auditory system sums energy is called the critical bandwidth; critical bandwidth varies with central frequency, being about 160 Hz wide at 1000 Hz (Scharf, 1970; Zwicker, Flottorp, & S. S. Stevens, 1957) . When components are sufficiently separated in frequency, however, that is, by several critical bandwidths, loudnesses combine in an approximately linear manner (Algom, Ben-Aharon, & Cohen-Raz, 1989; Marks, 1979b Marks, , 1980 Scharf, 1962 Scharf, , 1969 Schneider, 1988; Zwicker & Scharf, 1965 , Zwislocki, Ketkar, Cannon, & Nodar, 1974 ; see also, Fletcher & Munson, 1933) . Thus, simultaneously presenting two tones with widely spaced frequencies, the loudness of the total generally equals the sum of the loudnesses of the components. In the simplest case, when the two components are equally loud, the overall loudness is twice that of either component alone.
The purpose of the present experiment was to test the effect of stimulus range on the additivity ofloudnesses across widely separated tonal frequencies (1000 and 4000 Hz). Does changing stimulus range modify the exponent of the psychophysical power function, and, if so, does this modification reflect a change in the underlying sensory process of loudness summation? To answer these questions, we used the earlier tactics: Subjects judged the loudnesses of randomly alternating 1000-Hz, 4000-Hz, and 1000 + 4000-Hz stimuli under two widely differing ranges of SPL.
Method
Apparatus and procedure were the same as those used in Experiment 1, with one exception: Frequency replaced ear as the second stimulus variable. Instead of left-ear, right-ear, and binaural tones, subjects listened to 1000-Hz tones, 4000-Hz tones, and 1000 + 4000-Hz complexes, all fed monaurally to the right ear. Again, we ran two subexperiments. In Experiment 2a, the SPLs were those used in Experiment la, varying from 48 dB to 76 dB in the small-range condition, and from 34 dB to 90 dB in the large-range condition. In Experiment 2a, although not in 2b, we also attempted to match 1000-Hz and 4000-Hz components individually for each subject. Before the main subexperiment, each subject gave magnitude estimates of 1000-Hz and 4000-Hz tones, 34 to 90 dB SPL, intermixed within a single session. From these estimates, we calculated the levels of the 4000-Hz tone that matched each 1000-Hz tone. Thus, the dB levels reported later correspond in each case to SPLs at 1000 Hz.
In Experiment 2b, the single-tone stimuli were l0 dB greater than the two-tone stimuli. In the small-range condition, the SPLs of the single-tone stimuli varied from 54 to 78 dB, whereas the two-tone stimuli varied from 44 to 68 dB, both in 3-dB steps. In the largerange condition, the corresponding ranges were 42 to 90 dB and 32 to 90 dB, all in 6-dB steps. Again, as in Experiment lb, we decided to augment single-tone SPLs by 10 dB so as to match the loudnesses of the two-tone complexes in each range condition.
In each experiment, and for each range condition, the entire set of 27 tones (9 SPLs at each of 1000 Hz, 4000 Hz, and 1000 + 4000 Hz) was presented and judged a total of five times within the course of a session. Again, each subject served in four sessions, two judging the stimuli of the large-range set, the other two judging those of the smallrange set. The two range conditions were presented in strict alternation, their sequence counterbalanced across subjects.
The method again was free-modulus magnitude estimation. The same 8 subjects from Experiment la participated in Experiment 2a, and a total of 13 men and women, 8 of whom had participated in Experiment lb, participated in Experiment 2b.
Results and Discussion
Pooled data. Figure 4 gives the main results for data pooled geometrically over subjects. First, consider the results of Experiment 2a, depicted in the left-hand panel of Figure 4 . The judgments given to the 1000-Hz and 4000-Hz stimuli did not differ significantly and are averaged in Figure 4 to increase clarity of presentation. The horizontal separation of the one-tone and two-tone functions for each range represents the degree of loudness summation. The data show virtually no effect of stimulus range on exponent, although there is a slight tendency for greater additivity at the larger stimulus range. Quantitative analyses support the conclusions drawn from the visual inspection of the left-hand panel in Figure 4 . Increasing range produced no reliable decrease in the slopes of the loudness functions. If anything, the slopes at small range are slightly smaller than those at large range; for the two-tone complexes the exponents were 0.43 and 0.48, respectively, and for single tones 0.47 and 0.50. The fits to the power functions were good, the lowest value of r 2 being .983. As we soon see, large individual fluctuations probably contributed to the lack of a clear effect on exponent.
Next, consider the two-tone gain. Analogous to the binaural gain, two-tone gain refers to the increment in decibels by which a single-component tone (at 1000 Hz or 4000 Hz) had to be augmented to be as loud as the two-tone complex. With data collapsed over subjects, the gain equaled 7.0 dB for the small stimulus range and 7.6 dB for the large range. Interestingly, stimulus range seems to exert a minor influence on the summation even in the absence of a discernible effect on the overt magnitude-estimation exponent.
As noted earlier, the relation between average loudness judgments and sound pressure approximated power functions with exponents close to 0.50. The functions at 1000 Hz and 4000 Hz alone largely coincided, so they could be represented by a common loudness function. Presenting the 1000-Hz and 4000-Hz tones together increased overall perceived magnitude as much as augmenting the SPL of either one by 7 to 8 dB, short of the l0 dB predicted by linear summation in sones. On average, the 1000 + 4000-Hz complex sounded 1.53 times as loud as either the 1000-Hz or the 4000-Hz tone alone. If we correct the empirical loudness functions to agree with the sone scale (i.e., rescale the data to exponents of 0.6 rather than 0.5), the average ratio of two-tone to one-tone loudness increases to 1.7, still short of perfect summation. The present results, therefore, demonstrate only partial summation of loudness with tones separated by several critical bandwidths. The loudness scales, however, approximate S. S. Stevens's sone scale reasonably well. Now for the results of Experiment 2b. Somewhat surprisingly, the two-tone gain for large stimulus range collapses to zero at high SPL. Aside from this deviation, however, the main features observed in the results of Experiment la reappear here. All loudness functions conform well to a power relation, except for the large-range, two-tone condition at high SPL. The exponents of the functions equal about 0.33, with a slight, unreliable trend toward steeper slopes at smaller range. The two-tone gain was only 0.5 dB greater at large range than at small range (7.9 vs. 7.4 dB). If we include only the linear portions of the data (i.e., if we discount the results at the two highest SPLs in the large-range condition), then the difference in gain grows to 1.2 dB. In summary, varying stimulus range led at best to a tiny change in loudness summation.
Individual results. Table 2 summarizes the individual results from Experiments 2a and 2b. Figure 5 displays the loudness functions of the individual subjects in Experiment 2a. Individual variation is evident in the calculated exponents: Three subjects had greater exponents with the smaller than with the larger stimulus range, 3 others had just the opposite result, and the remaining 2 subjects had virtually identical exponents with both ranges. Not surprisingly, the overall Note. ns = exponent of single-tone loudness function (means of 1000 Hz and 4000 Hz); n, = exponent of two-tone (1000 + 4000 Hz) loudness function; TR ---two-tone:one-tone loudness ratio; TG = twotone gain in decibels.
range-induced difference in exponent equaled zero. Decibel measures of two-tone gain, however, proved less variable: For 6 of the 8 subjects, the gain at large range was greater than that at small range; although the two gains differed on average by 1.2 dB, this difference is not reliable, t(7) = 1.82, p =. 11. In Experiment 2b, only 8 of the 13 subjects gave greater exponents at small range than at large range (in l subject, the exponents are virtually the same). Clearly, range affected the exponent only slightly. Range also only weakly affected the two-tone gain. Although 9 of the 13 subjects showed greater gains at large range than at small range, the average difference amounts to 0.4 dB. Taken as a whole, the individual results show range to exert a very small effect at best on either the magnitude-estimation function or the underlying loudness summation.
Individual variation in psychophysical functions and measures of two-tone summation. In Experiment 2a, the individual variation in exponent was notable, exceeding 2:1 in both range conditions; the standard deviations amounted to approximately one third of the respective means. Exponents varied in a similar way in Experiment 2b. Again, however, the interindividual differences in exponent probably reflect, at least partly, vagaries associated with idiosyncratic use of numbers. With both stimulus ranges, the correlation coefficient between exponent and the log ratio of two-tone to onetone loudness was r(6) = .7, p = .05, and r(l 1) = .86, p < .001, in Experiments 2a and 2b, respectively. As indicated earlier, we expect a linear relation if exponent and summation ratio are affected by a common source of nonlinear bias in the overt numerical estimates.
Note that the interindividual variations in summation ratio were considerably smaller than the variations in exponent, standard deviations of the summation ratios being only about 6% of the means in Experiment 2a and 10% in Experiment 2b. Except for one probably anomalous subject (Subject 8), whose data showed minimal amounts of two-tone gain, gains also were fairly uniform. Thus, again a measure of loudness summation, here the decibel gain, shows considerably less interindividual variability than does the exponent of the psychophysical function. Nevertheless, real differences in the underlying scale of loudness may exist among people with normal hearing. In a recent study using nonmetric analyses that avoid numerical estimates altogether, Schneider (1988) found a 1.6:1 variation in the individual power-function exponents (see also Schneider, 1980) . absolute amount of summation was substantial, about 8 to 9 dB, falling just short of the l0 dB that marks perfect addition of loudness in sones. Exponents and loudness ratios alike turned out to be surprisingly low, however, averaging 0.34 and 1.44, respectively. Rescaling the data to agree perfectly with sones alters the loudness ratio to 1.9:1. This outcome follows from the fact that the two-tone and single-tone functions are separated horizontally by 8 to 9 dB, for a two-tone gain of 9 dB corresponds roughly to a 1.9:1 ratio ofloudnesses in sones.
Intraindividual consistency in loudness functions. A final
feature of the results deserves mention. Because the same subjects participated in Experiments la and 2a, we can look for consistency in the individual magnitude-estimation functions. In fact, there was a significant correlation between exponents in the two subexperiments, r(6) = .73, p < .03, exactly the same for both small and large stimulus ranges. The 8 subjects who participated in both Experiments lb and 2b also showed fairly stable exponents (the different taskrelated changes notwithstanding), with correlations of .57 for small range (nonsignificant) and .90 for large range (p < .01). These results are consistent with evidence that individual differences in exponent can remain stable over time (Algom & Marks, 1984; Barbenza, Bryan, & Tempest, 1970; Hellman, 1981; Wanschum & Dawson, 1974) , suggesting that subjects tend to use numbers in a consistent, albeit individual, way.
Conclusions
Both subexperiments on the summation of loudness across supercritically separated frequencies display minor effects of stimulus range at best. Changing range hardly affected the exponents of the power functions for single tones and twotone combinations. The effect on loudness summation also was slight, as gauged by two-tone gain in decibels. These results are compatible, therefore, albeit in a trivial way, with both Models 1 and 2.
Why did varying stimulus range exert a stronger effect on psychophysical performance in binaural summation than in two-tone summation? At present, we have no satisfactory explanation. Whatever the reason, the results garnered thus far imply that the full explanation for effects of range will be complex. The effects cannot be attributed simply to biases and vagaries associated with numerical estimates, nor does range affect the underlying scale values uniformly. At this point, we chose to investigate the effects of range on yet another phenomenon of loudness summation, namely, temporal integration.
Experiment 3. Temporal Summation: Effect of Stimulus Range
Auditory temporal integration refers to the process by which the ear integrates the acoustic input over time. When the duration of a sound falls below a critical duration, the auditory system responds roughly to total energy, that is, to the product of intensity and time, rather than to sound intensity alone, as it does when duration exceeds the critical value (e.g., Algom & Babkoff, 1978 Algom, Babkoff, & Ben Uriah, 1980; Algom, Palmon, & Cohen-Raz, 1989; Algom, Rubin, & Cohen-Raz, 1989; Garner, 1947; Zwislocki, 1960 Zwislocki, , 1969 . Although the rule of time-intensity trading varies as a function of sensation level (threshold vs. suprathreshold) and spectrum (tone vs. noise), nevertheless full integration for suprathreshold pure tones, like those used here, seems to hold up to about 200 ms (e.g., Algom & Marks, 1984; see also, Scharf, 1978 ; J. C. Stevens & Hall, t966) .
Our purpose was to see how stimulus range affects both the magnitude-estimation functions erected at the different durations and the degree of temporal loudness summation. Again, we asked, Do changes in the intensity range of the stimuli affect the slopes of the observed loudness functions? If they do, are the underlying measures of loudness integration modified as well?
Method
Apparatus and procedure were the same as those used in the previous experiments, except that duration replaced ear or frequency as the second auditory variable of interest. In this experiment, subjects listened to 40-ms and 500-ms bursts of 1000-Hz tones (rise/decay of 1 ms) fed monaurally to the right ear. SPLs were those used in Experiments la and 2a, varying from 48 to 76 dB in the small-range condition, and from 34 to 90 dB in the large-range condition.
The entire set of 18 stimuli (9 SPLs at each duration) was presented and judged a total of eight times within the course of a given session. Each of 8 (normal-hearing, Yale-affiliated) subjects served in four such sessions. In two they judged the stimuli of the large-range set, and in the other two they judged those of the small-range set. Again, the sets were presented in strict alternation, and the sequence was counterbalanced across subjects.
Results and Discussion
Exponents and summation. Pooled results appear in Figure 6 . Stimulus range exerted an appreciable effect: Collapsed over subjects and durations, the exponents of the power functions are 0.24 and 0.30 for large range and small range, respectively. Importantly, this change in exponent is accompanied by a corresponding change in the underlying measure of integration, expressed by the temporal gain. The temporal gain--the difference in decibels between equally loud brief and long sounds--was substantially greater at large range (7.6 dB) than at small range (4.9 dB). Thus, range-induced changes in the magnitude-estimation functions reflect a profound modification of the underlying process of integration, and perhaps of the underlying scale values for loudness itself. Table 3 gives the results of the individual subjects. Only 2 of the 8 subjects deviated from the pattern observed in the pooled data; their data showed slightly greater exponents in the large-range condition than in the small-range condition. The averages of the individual exponents were 0.25 at large range and 0.30 at small range, a nearly reliable difference, t(7) = 2.24, p = .06. Similarly, 6 of the 8 subjects had greater gains at large range than at small range; the difference averaged 2.7 dB, a reliable difference, t(7) = 2.41, p = .05. This means that to appear as loud as a long-duration tone, a brief tone of a given SPL had to be augmented by a greater number of decibels when it was chosen from a large range of intensities than when it was chosen from a small range of intensities. That stimulus range affects the stimuli that match for loudness (quite aside from its influence on the magnitude-estimate exponent) is certainly not parsimonious psychophysically and, to be sure, seems counterintuitive. Yet as the present experiments demonstrate, this result is the signature of how range affects two different phenomena of loudness integration: binaural summation and temporal integration. Table 3 also reveals considerable variability in both exponent (coefficients of variation about 21%) and temporal gain (coefficients of variation close to 60%), but significantly less variability in the ratio of long-duration to short-duration loudness (coefficients of variation about 8%). Moreover, there is absolutely no correlation between exponent and loudness ratio, r(6) = 0, for both large range and small range. Thus, we cannot attribute interindividual variation in both exponent and loudness ratio simply to transient, inconsequential differences in the overt numerical estimates; rather, at least one of the variations seems to reflect genuine sensory differences.
Also notable is the extremely large variation in temporal gain. The magnitude of individual variation in temporal summation seems at least as great as the magnitude of variation in overt loudness scales (exponents). Algom and Marks Note. nb ~-exponent of loudness function for short (40 ms) stimulus; n~ = exponent of loudness function for long (500 ms) stimulus; TeR = long-duration:short-duration loudness ratio; TeG = temporal gain in decibels.
(1984) reported the same outcome. That the quantitative character of temporal summation can vary so widely from person to person is important. Aside from its intrinsic interest for temporal auditory processing, such variation provides a framework to compare the relative magnitude of individual differences in overt judgment scales. Put in such a perspective, the typical interindividual variation in exponents need not be considered large or so disturbing as it is often held. Of course, other measures of loudness processing, such as the gain in binaural summation, appear much more stable over individuals. Our point is that the quantitative characteristics of substantive sensory processes can provide useful comparisons to measures of overt psychophysical judgments. Time-intensity reciprocity. The present measurements are too scanty (restricted to two durations) to attempt a serious appraisal of the time-intensity trade-off. As they are, if we assume integration lasts up to 500 ms, then the data suggest only partial temporal integration. That is, for 40-ms and 500-ms tones to appear equally loud, intensity had to be decreased less than a factor of 12.5 to offset the 12.5-fold increase in duration. If, however, critical duration is 200 ms, as most evidence indicates, then the present data too come close to displaying perfect temporal summation of sound energy (predicted gain of 7 dB). Almost all other studies (see Algom & Babkoff, 1984 , for a review) suggest at least perfect energy summation for suprathreshold tones (indeed, some studies suggest supersummation; e.g., Marks, 1987; see also, Algom et al., 1988) . Still, the present values should be treated as approximate.
Note, however, that our results suggest a flatter time-intensity trading function when the stimulus range is small than when the range is large; that is, time had a relatively weaker role in determining loudness at small than at large range. Thus, the results of Experiment 3 replicate the findings of Experiment 1 in two ways. First, range affected the magnitude-estimation exponent (the greater the range, the smaller the exponent); and second, range affected as well the loudness matches (the greater the range, the greater the temporal gain in decibels). Stimulus range can affect the underlying characteristics of dynamic auditory processes such as temporal integration. The results thus far lead to a surprising conclusion: When the exponent of the loudness function changes as a result of changing the range of stimulation, so too does the magnitude of loudness summation. Stimulus range, of course, is but one of many contextual and procedural manipulations known to exert a systematic effect on the exponent of psychophysical power functions. Another such variable is the method of judgment. In particular, the methods of magnitude estimation and magnitude production tend to yield systematically different exponents; exponents derived from production are usually greater in size. In estimation, the subject provides numbers to match the intensities of the stimuli presented by the experimenter; in production, the experimenter sets the numbers and the subject sets the stimulus intensities. The question posed by those experiments is, Do magnitude estimation and magnitude production produce not only different exponents, but different measures of loudness summation?
Method
In Experiment 4, stimuli were 1-s bursts of 1000-Hz tones, presented to the left, right, and both ears; in Experiment 5 they were 1-s bursts of 1000-Hz, 4000-Hz, and 1000 + 4000-Hz tones, presented monaurally to the right ear (except for 1 subject who listened with her left ear).
The method was the same in both experiments: For magnitude estimation, SPLs ranged from 35 to 80 dB in steps of 5 dB, making 30 different stimuli in all 10 SPLs in each of three conditions: left ear (Experiment 4) or 1000 Hz (Experiment 5); right ear or 4000 Hz; binaural or 1000 + 4000-Hz mode of delivery. Stimuli were presented one at a time to each subject, who assigned numbers proportional to loudness. No preselected standard or modulus was used. The entire set of 30 tones was presented seven times in the course of eacla of two experimental sessions and six times in the course of a third session (not necessarily the last), yielding 20 judgments per stimulus in all.
For magnitude production, the numerical stimuli were tailored to each individual's range of numbers, as previously revealed in her or his magnitude estimates. We took the range used by the subject, augmented it by about 10% at each end, and divided the new range into six approximately equal logarithmic intervals so as to provide the seven numbers (integers and decimal values) to be presented by the experimenter. Upon presentation of the first number, the subject set a sound intensity whose loudness corresponded to the size of that number. On subsequent trials, the subject set intensities in proportion to the numerical stimuli, adjusting the intensity of the tone until she or he was satisfied with the match. The type of tone in each trial, or mode--left ear (Experiment 4) or 1000 Hz (Experiment 5), right ear or 4000 Hz, binaural or 1000 + 4000 Hzwwas preselected randomly by the experimenter.
In Experiment 4, the entire set of 21 stimuli (seven numbers in each of the three modes) was presented and matched four times in the course of four experimental sessions, and three times in the course of two further sessions, making 22 settings of SPL in all to each number/mode. In Experiment 5, the entire set of 21 stimuli was presented and matched four times in the course of six experimental sessions, making 24 settings of SPL in all for each number/mode. Order of presentation of the numbers in the different modes as well as location in the sequence of the two shorter sessions in Experiment 5 was random and different for each subject. The same 5 men and women, paid volunteers from the Yale community, participated in both experiments.
Results and Discussion
Binaural summation. Table 4 summarizes the data of Experiment 4, and Figure 7 depicts typical examples. The individual results are clear and unequivocal and are in no need of reduction or normalization. For all subjects, exponents derived from estimation are considerably smaller than those derived from production, the means being 0.41 and 0.70, respectively, t(4) = 3.71, p --.02. Equally important, for all subjects the binaural gain in decibels is greater with estimation (7.0 dB) than with production (4.8 dB), t(4) = 3.20, p = .02. Taken as a whole, the results indicate that loudness matches did not remain invariant across method. A change from one method to the other altered the underlying degree of binaural summation, not just the overt judgment scale.
The ratio of binaural to monaural loudness for magnitude estimation averaged 1.42. The loudness functions in estimation, however, are characterized by an average exponent of only 0.41. Even if we rescale the magnitude-estimation function to agree perfectly with sones, the summation ratio remains low at 1.67. This low ratio corresponds to the binaural gain of about 7 dB. So the present results, like those of Experiment 1 a, indicate only partial summation of loudness across the two ears.
These results cast doubt on earlier interpretations (e.g., Model l) of the so-called regression effect, interpretations that explicitly or implicitly attribute regression wholly to response factors: Both magnitude production and magnitude estimation are assumed to introduce response biases that tend to shift the exponent up or down. The present results argue that using one procedure or the other materially affects the underlying processing of loudness itself, possibly by modifying either the scale values of loudness (the underlying powerfunction exponent) or the rule of binaural summation. There need not be a single, underlying perceptual exponent governing a continuum, one whose overt value can be altered depending on whether the method is magnitude estimation or production; instead, these scaling procedures themselves may establish distinctively different perceptual representations.
Two-tone summation. The results of Experiment 5, summarized and illustrated in Table 5 and Figure 8 , are equally straightforward. First, the psychophysical functions: For each subject, the exponent of the loudness function derived from estimation (M = 0.43) is smaller than that derived from production (M = 0.58), t(4) = 4.47, p = .01, and correspondingly, the two-tone gain is reliably greater, averaging 6.5 versus 2.2 dB, t(4) = 6.81, p = .01. Clearly, the regression effect is by no means limited to the metric characteristics of the overt loudness functions. Instead, contrary to Model 1 but consistent with Model 2, the choice of scaling method influences the degree of loudness summation itself, as well as the resulting pattern of numerical response.
Once again, the absolute measures of loudness summation are relatively low. The ratio of loudness of two-tone to singletone stimuli in magnitude estimation is 1.42. The average magnitude-estimation exponent is 0.43, so correcting the magnitude-estimation scale to sones does increase the summation ratio slightly, but only to 1.64:1, consistent with the decibel gain of 6.5 dB. Thus, the results point to a clear subadditivity of loudnesses across critical bands; subadditivity was also evident in the results of Experiment 2, although it is curious that manipulating scaling procedure in the present experiment did affect both exponent and gain, whereas manipulating stimulus range in Experiment 2 had no substantial effect. Note. nm ---exponent of monaural loudness function; n0 ---exponent of binaural loudness function; BR = binaural:monaural loudness ratio; BG = binaural gain in decibels. Decibels SPL Figure 7 . Binaural summation and regression: Average monaural and binaural loudness functions for two subjects constructed by magnitude estimation (ME) and by magnitude production (MP).
In sum, the results of Experiment 5 concur with those of Experiment 4 in demonstrating that the scaling procedure affects loudness summation, not just exponent. Contextual differences established by the tasks of magnitude estimation and magnitude production seem to influence the very loudness perceptions themselves. Such results jeopardize earlier explanations that seek to limit the scope of regression effects to influences on exponent through response transformations.
General Discussion

Power Function for Loudness: Effects of Range and Regression
Our data show relatively modest but nonetheless consistent effects of range on exponent. The demonstration is important because it has been done in a planned manner on fairly large selections of stimulus values, tasks, and observers. Many other studies of range effects, especially within modalities, have been essentially ex post facto reports, examining the relations among individual exponent, stimulus range (when it differed across subjects), and response range. Note, however, that those studies could not disentangle inherent individual variation in exponent or dynamic range (supposedly of perceptual origin) from variation because of stimulus range (supposedly of transitory nature). The limitation was recently recognized by Rollman and Harris (1987) : "Whether the present findings are simply dependent upon stimulus range effects or reflect, rather, an inherent interindividual variation in dynamic or sensitivity range may best be answered by experiments that vary the former for a population of observers differing in the latter" (p. 264). We introduced just this manipulation in the present series of experiments by varying the stimulus ranges 50%.
Moreover, our study demonstrates convincingly how changes in overt exponents can arise from two distinct sources: interindividual variation and experimentally induced contextual effects. Even after taking note of the omnipresent Figure 8 . Two-tone summation and regression: Average single-tone (mean of 1000-Hz and 4000-Hz presentations) and two-tone (1000 + 4000 Hz) loudness functions for 2 subjects constructed by magnitude estimation (ME) and magnitude production (MP).
individual variation in loudness scales, stimulus range adds further systematic variation. Conversely, even after tightly controlling stimuli and tasks, loudness scales derived from methods such as magnitude estimation vary considerably from person to person. In addition, removing the systematic effect of range does not substantially reduce this variability (see also Algom & Marks, 1984; Poulton, 1968; Schneider, 1980 Schneider, , 1988 S. S. Stevens, 1956; R. Teghtsoonian, 1973) . Last, we reproduced the regression effect: Larger exponents are obtained with magnitude production than with estimation. This effect is considerable (e.g., Cross et al., 1975) . Beyond mere replication, our studies show that the systematic variation expressed by regression goes beyond ineluctable individual differences in the overt loudness functions.
Processes of Loudness Integration. Range and Regression Effects
The theoretical stance taken throughout this article and in earlier ones (Algom et al., 1988; Algom & Marks, 1984; Algom, Palmon, & Cohen-Raz, 1989; Marks, 1974 Marks, , 1978b Marks, , 1979b is that psychophysical scales are most usefully interpreted within the study of substantive sensory processes. In fact, data and theories of sensory functioning can help to validate the scales. Several elaborate models of multidimensional nature have been developed to address the methodological problem (e.g., Anderson, 1970 Anderson, , 1981 Anderson, , 1982 Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971 ). Yet, as Marks's (1979b) analysis of scale/process relations in loudness shows, the issue is substantive and not just methodological. Loudness scales, according to Marks's experiments and derivations, are natural outcomes of auditory processes and experimental data. Hence, joint scrutiny of loudness scales and loudness processes is sine qua non from a theoretical vantage as well.
What is new in this study, therefore, is the way that processes of loudness integration relate to the experimentally manipulated contexts. Where earlier investigations of range and regression effects limited themselves to scaling proper, the present experiments combined contextual variation with study of basic characteristics of auditory intensity processing (e.g., binaural summation) in an effort to locate the contextual effects. We studied, for the first time to the best of our knowledge, whether range and regression affect sensory processes and the underlying scales mediating these processes. We found that the perceptual processes themselves do not remain invariant when we alter range of stimulation or method of measurement.
Let us spell out a few implications of these results to capture their remarkable nature. A given set of SPLs appears louder when listened to with both ears than with only one (binaural summation), and one way to express this difference is to specify the number of decibels needed to augment the monaural stimuli to sound as loud as the binaural ones (binaural gain). It turned out that the mere spread of the SPLs presented (wide range vs. narrow range) affects the binaural gain. For a given person, binaural tone A may sound as loud as monaural tone B in one stimulus context, but louder or softer than B in another context. This perturbation in matches applies to all sounds that appear in the two stimulus distributions (i.e., applies to the entire set of sounds in the narrow-range condition). For example, a 50-dB tone heard by two ears may sound as loud as a 57-dB tone heard by one ear in the company of narrowly spread intensities (say 40-60 dB SPL), but may sound as loud as a 59-dB monaural tone in the company of more widely spread intensities (say 20-80 dB). Either the sensory representation of the 50-dB tone or the rule of summation changed when context changed.
A well-known psychological dictum thus is confirmed by the present results: The perception of a stimulus is determined not only by its own properties, but also by the properties of other stimuli that might have been presented (Garner, 1962 (Garner, , 1974 . Although this notion has been used mainly in the context of information theory, the present results indicate that it may apply to the processing of stimulus intensity as well. Obviously, experimental manipulation of the range of stimulation is an explicit means of marking the inferred set of potential stimuli.
Analogous conclusions hold with respect to the role of regression in the perception of loudness. Magnitude production does more than just produce systematically higher exponents than does magnitude estimation; production induces a change in perceptual processing. Loudness matches as well as overt loudness scales do not enjoy generality across different contexts; matches and scales alike can be altered by changing either the method of generation or the range of intensities.
Taken as a whole, the present results conflict with accepted response-based explanations of range and regression effects, as described in Model 1. These results do support the second model of contextual influence outlined earlier here, a model we described as perceptual. By and large, exponents changed without the corresponding changes in summation ratios predicted by the response-based model. We may think of context either as modifying underlying rate-of-growth of loudness, and not just loudness response, or as differentially modifying monaural versus binaural processing (and one-tone vs. twotone processing; short-duration vs. long-duration processing).
Two Kinds of Range-Related Contextual Effects
We need to distinguish between the contextual effects demonstrated here and another type of contextual effect that is sometimes also dubbed a range effect, but should more properly be called a level effect. The latter refers to results obtained in procedures that use partially overlapping levels of stimulus intensities. The subset of stimuli common to different sets of intensities is judged on different occasions along with either the members of the high set of intensities or with the members of the low set. Studies using this general design look back to an eminent psychological tradition, probably starting with Hollingworth (1910) , and still are popular (e.g., Foley & Cross, 1989; Marks, 1988; Marks et al., 1986; Mellers & Birnbaum, 1982; Parducci et al., 1976) . Their upshot is that identical stimuli presented in different sets of intensity are judged to be different, indicating a substantial relativistic component in judgment.
A property common to these studies is that the target stimuli greatly change their relative position--their rank orderwwhen they appear in the different sets (or, alternatively, when the frequency distributions are altered). A 50-dB sound presented in an evenly distributed 40-80 dB range occupies a lower percentile point than does the same 50-dB sound presented in a comparable 20-60 dB range. Not so in the present experiments: Because range was widened or truncated symmetrically, stimuli largely retained the same relative position in the different contextual conditions. Despite the preservation of relative as well as absolute stimulus levels, the invariance properties changed. Most likely, the range effects found here tap a process that is at least partly independent of the process tapped by changing relative position in the stimulus set.
Birnbaum and his associates (e.g., Birnbaum, 1974; Birnbaum et al., 1971; Mellers & Birnbaum, 1982 ; see also Mellers, 1982) investigated contextual effects (stimulus range, stimulus spacing, frequency of stimulus presentation, etc.) from the vantage of Parducci's (e.g., 1974 ) range-frequency theory. Results often were analyzed according to Anderson's (e.g., 1981 Anderson's (e.g., , 1982 functional-measurement approach. These researchers used a variety of tasks such as judgments of averages, judgments of differences, and judgments of ratios as a means of elucidating contextual effects and for testing explanatory theories. However, as Marks (1978b) and Algom and Marks (1984) noted, superimposing complex cognitive operations on sense perception may actually add more nonlinear transformations onto the data and thus may complicate the solution. Criteria are needed beyond mere metric structure or other considerations based on mathematical convenience. Measures of substantive sensory performance can provide such criteria. Indeed the hallmark of our approach is the resort to basic sensory processes as the source of scale validation. The present data speak to the importance of context in the determination of the perceptual representation itself. Thus, contrary to Birnbaum's (1974) claim, our results cast doubt on the very possibility of pure, "context-invariant" psychophysical functions. Similarly, our results limit the conclusion of Mellers and Birnbaum (1982) , who, for intramodal stimuli, place the loci of contextual influences in the judgment function. In general, because of the lack of a relativistic component in the present stimulus sets, the range-frequency theory seems largely irrelevant to the results found here.
Of special interest to the present results and interpretations is Marks's (1988) conjecture that relativistic stimulus-level effects might stem from response biases. We reach a different conclusion with respect to the present range effects. Note, however, that the response models depicted by Marks are merely descriptive; his study left open the "deeper theoretical issue [that] concerns the way loudness is encoded" (p. 524). The present results, as well as data collected recently by Parker and Schneider (1988) , imply that at least part of the contextual effect studied by Marks may have a perceptual basis as well.
Loudness Scales and the Context of Loudness Judgments
Taken together, the present results may not bode well for any unirepresentational scheme of loudness perception (e.g., Anderson, 1972; Birnbaum & Elmasian, 1977; S. S. Stevens, 1971) . In fact, they may be inconsistent even with dualrepresentation or triple-representation theories of loudness (e.g., Algom & Marks, 1984; Marks, 1979a Marks, , 1979b . No satisfactory theory can handle these data without acknowledging several different transformations that may intervene between stimulation and perception. Moreover, these transformations cannot be relegated to context-induced or taskinduced nonlinearities that affect only the response scale, and this in a uniform manner. The separate existence of the scales or rules of summation is demonstrable on the basis of sensory equalities.
Any model aimed at explaining the present results should acknowledge explicitly that the different context-induced scales are valid measures of perceptual processing. An extension of Marks's (1979b) theory of loudness can accomplish this. Marks argued that the same sounds take on different perceptual values depending on whether they are judged with respect to loudness or to loudness difference. The present data suggest that the same sounds are represented differently in the auditory system depending on the stimulus range and scaling procedure.
How might range and regression affect the underlying scale of loudness or rule of summation? Does range or task influence the sensory activity in primary auditory receptors on the basilar membrane? It seems to us unlikely that context modifies initial transduction processes or auditory-nerve function. Still the different context-induced scales presumably do exist as organizations somewhere in the auditory system. Their activation depends on the task or context imposed on the subject.
The prospect of a multitude of loudness scales, each depending on the special features--the context--germane to its construction, surely constitutes an unwelcome prospect. Fortunately, as a rule, range-produced variations in exponent appear considerably smaller than everpresent individual differences, the latter presumably caused by differences in the use of numbers and numerical concepts.
In a more substantive vein, the idea that the same set of stimuli assumes different sets of psychological representations depending on context is neither startling nor new. As we mentioned in our earlier study (Algom & Marks, 1984) , it is an accepted assumption in the related domain of the psychology of similarity (e.g., Krumhansl, 1978; Tversky, 1977) . Thus, subjects would judge North Korea to be more similar to the Soviet Union than the Soviet Union is to North Korea; the mere posing of the stimulus statement changes the relevant psychological values. Germany and France seem more alike when Brazil is included in the set of countries than when only European countries are included. The rank order of a constant subset of stimuli can change when judged along with different sets of other stimuli. Clearly, the psychological representation, the scale, may depend on so-called task or context variables (see also Eisler, 1963) .
The present data demonstrate exactly the same patterns with nonlinguistic stimuli. Changing the range of stimulus intensities probably alters the discriminability of the member stimuli much as context alters the diagnosticity (cf. Tversky, 1977) of linguistic stimuli. In both cases, the perceptual system adjusts to accommodate salient features of the stimulus set as a whole to optimize performance. In fact, the steeper slope at small range may imply keener resolving power. A reciprocal relation may exist between rate of growth of sensation--exponent--and resolving power--Weber fraction (e.g., Baird & Noma, 1978; R. Teghtsoonian, 1971 R. Teghtsoonian, , 1973 . Hence, the taproot of contextual effects in psychology may rest with sensory processing. In any case, the robustness of contextual effects across different psychological domains provides one constraint on using the human observer as a null measure for both sensory and semantic stimuli.
